

gether to refer such a judgment to our emotional nature, or mere sensibility.

We apprehend a mathematical proposition, and we declare it to be true; here there is acknowledged on all hands to be a judgment. We apprehend next instant a cruel, ungenerous action; and we declare it to be wrong. Now, in the one case, as in the other, there is a judgment of the mind. It is true, that in the two cases, the judgments are pronounced according to very different principles or laws—so very different as to justify us in speaking of the conscience as different from the reason. It is quite conceivable that the mind might possess reason, and distinguish between the true and the false, and yet be incapable of distinguishing between virtue and vice. We are entitled, therefore, to maintain, that the drawing of moral distinctions is not comprehended in the simple exercise of the reason. The conscience, in short, is a different faculty of the mind from the mere understanding. We must hold it to be simple and unresolvable, till we fall in with a successful decomposition of it into its elements. In the absence of any such decomposition, we hold that there are no simpler elements in the human mind which will yield us the ideas of the morally good and evil, of moral obligation and guilt, of merit and demerit. Compound and decompound all other ideas as you please—associate them, together as you may—they will never give us the ideas referred to, so peculiar and full of meaning, without a faculty implanted in the mind for this very purpose.*

This faculty has to do with a particular class of objects, in regard to which it judges and pronounces a decision. "There is a principle of reflection," says Butler, "in men, by which they distinguish between, approve and disapprove of, their own actions. We are plainly constituted such sort of creatures as to reflect on our own nature. The mind can, take a view of what passes

within itself, its propensions, aversions, passions, affections, as

* Sir James Mackintosh (in the Preliminary Dissertation to the Encyclopædia Britannica) thinks that the phenomena of conscience can be accounted for by the association of ideas. We meet this theory with the important principle, overlooked by not a few in reference to other matters on which it bears, that association of ideas is the mere law of the succession of ideas, and cannot give a new idea, without a separate faculty for the purpose. Had Mackintosh fully unfolded his theory, we suspect that it would at once have been seen, that we must have a principle to account for the idea itself, as well as to account for the way in which it is connected with other ideas.